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existing literature in that candidates do not exchange policy influence for campaign
contributions, rather, they must decide how to allocate their efforts between policy-
making and fundraising. If high-ability candidates are better policymakers and better
fundraisers then they will raise and spend campaign funds even if voters care only
about legislation. Voters’ inability to reward or punish politicians based on past policy
allows fundraising to be used to signal ability at the expense of voter welfare. Cam-
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finance reform. We also show our model is consistent with findings in the empirical
and theoretical campaign finance literature.
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When we were spending so much time raising money, we simply could not devote
quality time to thoughtful decisions and debate. It lowered the substance of our
work.
-US Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY)1
1 Introduction
Proponents of campaign finance reform claim that campaign contributions corrupt politicians
and bias policy. While conventional wisdom suggests the existence of such an effect, there
is a dearth of systematic supportive evidence. This absence is not due to a lack of study.
If one examines closely all of the arguments in favor of restricting campaign contributions,
a more defensible criticism emerges: raising campaign funds corrupts the time allocation of
politicians. They spend too much time and energy raising money and too little time and
energy governing. In this paper we explain how this inefficiency persists, and demonstrate
how reform would alleviate it.
Most of the academic literature agrees with the proponents of campaign finance reform.
In this literature it is assumed that “parties bias their policy choices to attract money from
interest groups and then use this money to attract the votes of the uninformed.”2 Recent
empirical work calls both of these assumptions into question. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo
and Snyder (2003) argue that campaign contributions appear to have no effect on legislative
behavior. Additionally, if advertising is informative enough to justify the money spent on
it, we should expect that changing levels of advertising would have profound effects on the
outcomes of elections. This too lacks empirical support (Levitt, 1994).
1Taken from:
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial opinion/oped/articles/2006/03/10/limit campaign fund raising/
2Quote from Coate (2004a). For models of this type see: Baron (1989), Snyder (1990), Prat (2002a,b),
Coate (2004a) and Ashworth (2006). Prat (2006) and Coate (2004b) make a distinction between service-
induced contributions, which are defined as above, and position-induced contributions, where contributions
are given based on past voting records. For the purposes of this discussion the two are observationally
equivalent. Funds increase the chance of (re-)election and candidates must take a certain position to obtain
them. For a complete theoretical treatment of this point see Fox (2007).
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It is clear, however, that the pursuit of campaign contributions distorts the allocation
of politicians’ time, attention, and effort. In his dissent to Randall v. Sorell, Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens writes, “Fundraising devours the time and attention of
political leaders, leaving them too busy to handle their public responsibilities effectively.”
(528 U.S. (2006)) Many politicians echo his statement. Former Senator, Vice-President
and presidential candidate Walter Mondale (D-MN) asserts, “Candidates and officeholders
spend far too much time raising money [in order] to run for office.” Former Senator Nancy
Kassebaum (R-KS) states, “Here we are forced to raise money all the time. I don’t worry
about money influencing our votes. But I worry about the energy it takes. I just don’t know
how people find time to think or reflect.” Former Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D-SC)
says that fundraising “distracts us from the people’s business ... It corrupts and degrades
the entire political process.”3
We incorporate this bias in effort into a dynamic signaling model that does not rely
on vote buying and the accompanying biases in policy. In every election cycle politicians
exert effort toward implementing policy and toward raising and spending campaign funds.
These activities are costly to politicians. We assume that high-ability candidates are better
policymakers and better fundraisers, so they can use these activities to signal their privately
known ability.4 A high-ability politician wants to signal her type at minimum cost. When
the marginal costs of each of these activities are increasing, it will generally be cheaper to
signal through both channels than to signal through only one.
The assumption that high-ability candidates are better fundraisers is supported by both
proponents of loosely regulated campaign financing and the scholarly literature. The amount
of money raised by a candidate is often used as a measure of politician quality (see, for ex-
ample, Squire (1992, 1989) and Bond, Covington and Fleisher (1985)). The equation of
3The quote from Mondale comes from the “The Money Pit,” The New York Times, March 25, 1997. The
quotes from Hollings and Kassebaum are from http://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-030.html
4Our model is theoretically similar to the one-shot, multi-dimensional signaling models of Wilson (1985)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and could be easily extended to incorporate any number of signaling
channels.
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fundraising with candidate ability is so pervasive that it was recently bemoaned by a colum-
nist for The Philadelphia Inquirer.5 Moreover, this is a common, often implicit, assumption
in the theoretical literature on campaign finance (Coate, 2004b; Prat, 2006).
Readers may object to our implicit assumptions about donor incentives. However, we
believe it is possible to gain insights into campaign finance without fully modeling these
incentives, just as it is possible to gain insight into elections without fully modeling voters’
incentives (i.e. by ignoring that the decision to vote is irrational in most cost/benefit mod-
els). As in models of elections, we capture what is a potentially complex process through
a reduced-form assumption: namely personal inclinations play an important role in the de-
termination of donations. This assumption can be backed by an analysis of individual-level
giving in elections, where a vast majority of donations come from individuals that give to a
single candidate that matches their partisan orientation (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and
Snyder, 2003).
Voters cast their ballots based solely on the expected quality of candidates’ future poli-
cies.6 Voters are not fooled or bought by campaign expenditures, nor do they have preferences
for any innate characteristics a politician may posses. Why then are candidates concerned
with signaling their ability? The answer follows directly from the dynamic structure of the
repeated election setup. Every period high-ability politicians will signal their ability through
implementing better policy (and raising more funds) than low-ability politicians. Therefore,
voters prefer to have high-ability politicians in office.7
A rational electorate must base their decisions only on future expectations, so voters
cannot commit to ignoring fundraising or to rewarding politicians for past policies. Because
5“Measuring Candidates by Fund-Raising Skills”, June 29, 2007. In their study of the North Carolina
State Legislature, Prat, Puglisi and Snyder (2005) find that higher quality candidates do raise more money.
6In order to focus on the effort allocation decision of politicians, we assume quality of policy is single-
dimensional and all voters prefer higher quality. Adding heterogeneous policy positions does not affect the
results as long as the standard conditions are met for platforms to converge to the ideal point of the median
voter (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957).
7This feature is unique within models with office-motivated candidates, and provides a foundation for
candidate valence in one-period games. Valence is defined as the direct utility that a voter gets from having
a high-ability politician in office. For a foundation of valence when candidates can also be policy-motivated,
see Callander (2005).
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voters cannot commit to incentive contracts with their elected officials, politicians continue
to signal through fundraising, although voters would prefer they signaled solely through
making better policy.
Limiting the ability of candidates to signal through campaign expenditures forces them
to expend less effort raising and spending campaign funds. In order to preserve separation
in equilibrium, this effort (and more) will be expended on making higher quality policy,
which will increase voter welfare. While previous models also predict that campaign finance
reform would increase voter welfare, these predictions follow directly from the assumption
that campaign funds influence policy.8
One might ask, “If the literature is so sure that campaign finance reform would increase
voter welfare, why has campaign funding grown at the same rate as GDP over the last 100
years?” Our model provides an answer to this question as well: campaign finance reform
makes incumbent politicians worse off. Thus, we would not expect them to enact legislation
that would curtail campaign spending.9
In addition, our model encapsulates many findings from a diverse set of theoretical and
empirical work. Incumbents are more likely to win than their challengers. This is due
to a selection effect already identified in the literature. We also predict that high-ability
challengers may be deterred by incumbents’ high fundraising in the previous period.
Finally, in vote-buying models, campaign spending has two opposing effects on voter
welfare. Spending plays an informational role by helping voters decipher which politicians
will be best if elected. This is good for voter welfare. However, spending also entails that
8Note that we focus on policies that constrain the usefulness of campaign spending for signaling. This
is different from unconstitutional direct limits on campaign spending. We consider other restrictions such
as limits on individual or PAC giving briefly in Footnote 21. Both of these points are discussed in greater
detail in Section 3.2.
9While politicians regularly pass bills labeled “campaign finance reform,” these seem to have little or
no effect on fundraising or incumbent outcomes. We note that 13 major campaign finance bills have been
passed since 1867, and yet campaign spending has risen ten times faster than inflation and on par with
GDP. Note that there have been large swings in the per GDP level of spending, but long-term decreases are
generally not preceded by the adoption of campaign finance laws. Indeed, it often seems to be the other way
around (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder, 2003, p. 120). Consistent with our theory, at the state
level Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006) find campaign finance laws do not affect the rate at which
incumbents win elections.
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policy choice is biased away from the preferences of the electorate. This is bad for voter
welfare, and thus there is a tradeoff. In our model we eliminate this tradeoff by retaining only
the informational role. Yet, even though campaign contributions do not buy policy influence,
we find that limiting campaign spending enhances voter welfare by shifting politicians’ efforts
from fundraising to governing.
2 The Model
We model a repeated election process. There are time periods t = 1, 2, 3, ... where an election
is held at the beginning of each period t ≥ 2. The players are voters and two candidates
in each election: the incumbent and the challenger. The candidate who wins the election
in period t− 1 is the incumbent in period t, and the candidate who loses never runs again.
Each period, each candidate has privately known ability (or type), θti , which can be either
low or high, θti ∈ {L,H}. The probability of candidate i being type H is pti ∈ (0, 1), which is
common knowledge among all players. Challengers are high types with probability p, as are
incumbents who were low types in the previous period. The probability that an incumbent
who was a high type in the last period is a high type again is p > p.10 The substantive
reason for these switching probabilities is that things change. As time progresses, political
circumstances alter and certain politicians may no longer be as effective as they once were.
Others may become more effective.
The actions available to voters are voting for the incumbent or the challenger in a given
election. The actions available to candidate i in each period are putting effort into increasing
the quality of policy, qti ∈ R+, and/or putting effort into raising and spending funds, f ti ∈
R+.11 That is, in each period, candidates simultaneously choose pairs (qti , f ti ) ∈ R2+. These
10The model can be extended to encompass more complex switching processes, a wider array of potential
challengers, or a larger number of candidate actions with varying value to voters. The ideas will be precisely
the same, but the algebra more cumbersome and less transparent. A lengthier technical justification for
switching probabilities can be found in an earlier working paper, see Daley and Snowberg (2006).
11Challengers are assumed to hold other political offices prior to the election. In Section 5, we comment
on what happens if this does not hold. If only incumbents signal through policymaking all welfare claims
5
activities are costly, but more costly for a low type. Denote c(q, f |θ) as the cost function for
a candidate of type θ taking actions q and f . We assume:
Assumption 1 For each θ, c(q, f |θ) is continuous, convex, and strictly increasing. Addi-
tionally c(0, 0|θ) = 0, and for all c ∈ R+ there exists q(c, θ) and f(c, θ) such that c(q(c, θ), 0|θ) =
c = c(0, f(c, θ)|θ).
Assumption 2 −c(q, f |θ) satisfies strict increasing differences in (q, f) and θ. That is, for
all (q′, f ′) ≥ (q, f), (q′, f ′) 6= (q, f): c(q′, f ′|H)− c(q, f |H) < c(q′, f ′|L)− c(q, f |L).
The first assumption implies that isocost curves for both types are continuous, intersect
both axes and have convex lower contour sets (the set of points that are no more costly
than the points on the isocost curve). The second assumption states that any increase in
the quality of policy q and/or fundraising f costs a low type incrementally more than a high
type.12 Together these assumptions imply that for a given cost c > 0, a high type’s isocost
curve at that level lies everywhere above a low type’s isocost curve for the same level.13
Note that the candidates’ cost functions are very general. In particular, they do not
rule out complementarities between fundraising and making better policy—we allow for the
possibility that additional fundraising activity will lower the marginal cost of creating quality
policy. For example, campaign fundraising events may also serve to educate a candidate
about issues that are important to her constituents.
Candidates value winning office and minimizing their cost of doing so. The per-period
value of being in office is common among all candidates, and normalized to 1. Voters receive
utility from higher quality policy, which is directly observable. The per-period utility of a
still hold. Nothing would be changed if the efforts of a high type are also more productive.
12Assumption 2 is not a necessary condition for positive fundraising in equilibrium. Without Assumption
2 positive fundraising can exist in equilibrium even if both types find fundraising equally costly.
13The model can easily be extended to accommodate any finite number of types since Assumption 2
guarantees that cost functions are such that each type only needs to worry about preventing imitation by
the type immediately below it.
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candidate ut who selects policy and fundraising levels (qt, f t) and voters vt for having policy
qt and a politician of ability θt during period t are:
ut(qt, f t|θt) = I{in office} − c(qt, f t|θt)
vt(qt) = qt
All candidates have a common positive discount factor δ ≤ 1. Each individual voter can
have any positive discount factor. We define our equilibrium concept as follows.
Definition 1 We use the term equilibrium to mean a sequential equilibrium that satisfies
the intuitive criterion.14
We restrict the number of equilibria by assuming throughout that when voters are indif-
ferent between electing either candidate, each is equally likely to win. We focus on symmetric
Markov Perfect equilibria, so a pure strategy is a map from a candidate’s type into an ac-
tion.15 An equilibrium is symmetric if all candidates use the same strategy.
Denote piθ(pi) as a candidate’s probability of winning an election if types will be revealed,
given that her type is θ and her opponent has probability pi of being a high type. Let xθ
be a candidate of type θ’s gain from being perceived as a high type, rather than a low type,
which is just the increase in the probability of being elected times the value of being in office.
The value of being in office, η(θ), is both the immediate reward, 1, and the possibility of
14Sequential equilibrium is from Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and the intuitive criterion is from Cho and
Kreps (1987). To handle a continuum of possible actions, sequential equilibrium is adapted as in Cho and
Kreps (1987). To use the intuitive criterion in a model with multiple senders, we impose that voter beliefs
regarding candidate i’s type are independent of the actions of any other player j 6= i. The intuitive criterion is
then applied each period to voter beliefs regarding each candidate i, holding their beliefs about her opponent
j’s type as fixed. The criterion is applied in each period as follows. Fix a proposed equilibrium. If in any
period t, for either candidate i, there exists a signal (qti , f
t
i ) such that any best response of the voters for the
rest of the game to beliefs that i is a high type for sure in period t given that i chose (qti , f
t





a profitable deviation for the high type, but not for the low type, then the proposed equilibrium fails the
intuitive criterion. This version of the criterion actually has little bite because it does not restrict beliefs in
periods s > t. However, when voters’ best responses are also assumed to satisfy the Markov property, the
intuitive criterion works similarly to how it does in a one-period game.
15 In richer setups of the model, such as when there are more than two candidates, the probability
distributions over each candidate’s type can be payoff relevant. See the Appendix for a discussion of state
variables in Markov Perfect equilibria.
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being re-elected:
xθ = (piH − piL) η(θ) = (piH − piL) (1 + ρ(θ)) (1)
where ρ(θ) represents the present-discounted value of the flow of benefits from the possibility
of being re-elected, which is dependent on θ.16 High types are more likely to remain high
types (p < p), and, as shown later, more likely to be elected, so ρ(H) > ρ(L), and xH > xL.
Before investigating our repeated elections model, it is useful to study a simpler, one-
shot game. Much of the intuition, central themes and analysis will easily carry over from
the one-shot to the repeated game.
3 A Single Election Model
In our single election model there are two periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. The incumbent holds office
in period 1. An election is held at the beginning of period 2, with the winner holding office
for the remainder of the game. The actions available to candidates and their per-period
cost functions and utility functions are the same as in the repeated election model. We
alter voter’s preferences so they now receive utility from both higher quality policy, which
is directly observable, and from having a high-ability leader. We will see in the repeated
elections model that high types will offer higher quality policies than low types in subsequent
periods. The direct benefit to voters of a high type is meant to approximate this phenomenon
in the single election context. Voters now have the per-period utility function:
vt(θt, qt) = I{θt=H} + qt
The equilibrium strategies in the second period are simple: whichever candidate i was
elected will not enact policy in the second period (q2i = 0), since it is costly and the world
ends immediately after. In the second period, voters obtain v2(θ2i , 0) = I{θ2i=H}. The voters’
16For a stationary equilibrium it is only necessary to ensure that no type can profit from a one step
deviation. This is why ρ(θ) is the proper component in xθ.
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objective is thus to select the candidate more likely to be a high type after the election.
Since p > p, voters will elect the candidate shown to be more likely to be a high type in the
first period. We now analyze the first period, omitting the time superscripts, and refer to
the first period of the single election model as the one-shot game. Referring to (1), note in
the one-shot game the probability that a candidate of type H and L respectively wins, given
the probability that her opponent is a high type is pi and types are revealed in a separating
equilibrium, is piH(pi) = (1− pi) + pi2 , piL(pi) = (1−pi)2 and η(θ) = 1. Thus, xθ, the gain to a
candidate of type θ from being perceived as a high type, is equal to 1
2
for all pi ∈ (0, 1) and
all θ ∈ {L,H}.
We show that a symmetric least cost separating equilibrium always exists, and charac-
terize its properties.17 Further, we show that all equilibria must be least cost separating,
and find conditions under which there exists a unique equilibrium.
3.1 No Campaign Finance Reform
Let (qθ, fθ) denote the equilibrium action of a candidate with type θ ∈ {L,H}. Our equi-
librium concept dictates that in any separating equilibrium low type candidates do nothing
(qL, fL) = (0, 0) as expending effort will not help them gain office, and they dislike it. High
types set their levels of policy and fundraising to minimize costs while preventing imitation
by low-type candidates. That is, high types solve the following minimization problem:
min
qH ,fH
c(qH , fH |H) (2)
s.t. c(qH , fH |L) ≥ xL
The continuity of cost functions implies the constraint must bind. Since c(q, f |H) is continu-
ous and Assumption 1 guarantees that {q, f : c(q, f |L) = xL} is a compact set, the minimum
exists and is obtained. The solution is most easily seen graphically. Figures 1.a–1.g show
17Equilibrium here is as in Definition 1. We restrict to Markov Perfect equilibrium only in the repeated
game.
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candidate’s isocost curves. Points up and to the right are more costly. The thick curve is a
low type’s isocost for c(q, f |L) = xL. The solution lies on this curve. The thinner curves are
the isocosts belonging to a high type—whose objective is to find the cheapest of her curves
that touches the thick one.
Figures 1.a and 1.b show cases where a high type’s problem has a unique interior solution.
This occurs when c(q, f |H) is “more convex” than c(q, f |L).18 Figure 1.a illustrates a case
where both cost functions are symmetric in q and f . Figure 1.b shows when the two types
have different relative trade-offs between f and q, the solution will be unique and interior
with qH 6= fH . Figures 1.c and 1.d show cases where c(q, f |H) is “no more convex” than
c(q, f |L), but the two functions have different trade-offs between f and q. This leads to a
corner solution. In these figures, a high type’s trade-off favors fundraising and policymaking,
respectively, so a high type signals only through these channels. Figure 1.e shows that when
a low type and a high type have the same isocost curves (varying only by the values attached
to those curves), any point on the thick curve is a solution. Figure 1.f shows that a point of
tangency is not always a solution.
When the cost functions are differentiable we can use the well-known techniques of pro-
ducer theory to find interior solutions. By writing down a high type’s Lagrangian and solving

















This necessary condition for an interior solution to (2) states that the ratio of marginal costs
for both types must be the same at any interior solution. Suppose this were not true and
the left side of (3) was greater than the right. Then a high type could decrease her choice of
q slightly and correspondingly increase her choice of f to keep a low type’s cost of imitation
unchanged—i.e. move along the low type’s isocost curve. Given that the left side of (3) is
18The term “more convex” is used informally only. A sufficient condition to ensure that any point of
tangency is indeed a minimum of (2) is that c(q, f |H)− c(q, f |L) is pseudo-convex.
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greater than the right, this change will yield a cost savings for a high type. Therefore, a
high type can both decrease her total cost of effort and make it no easier for a low type to
imitate her. This is an improvement for a high type, and the original allocation was not
optimal. Graphically, (3) states that the isocost curves of the two types must be tangent at
any interior solution. If they intersected, there would exist near-by (q, f) pair that was both
below the high type’s isocost and above the low type’s. Such a pair is an improvement for
a high type, and the original allocation was not optimal. Notice that (2) may have a corner
solution as in Figures 1.d and 1.e, or a boundary may provide the minimum even when (3)
has a solution, as in Figure 1.f.
To complete the equilibrium analysis, we need to verify that a high type wants to separate.
This fact is immediate from Assumption 2. Any solution (qH , fH) lies on the curve {q, f :
c(q, f |L) = xL}. Assumption 2 implies then that any solution must also lie on a curve
{q, f : c(q, f |H) = c} for some c < xL. Since c < xL = xH , separation is worth the cost to a
high type.
Proposition 1 In the one-shot game, all equilibria are separating with low types choosing
(qL, fL) = (0, 0) and high types choosing a solution to (2). A symmetric equilibrium always









All proofs are in the appendix. In the proof we construct and verify the set of equilibria
described above. The intuitive criterion and Assumption 2 rule out pooling equilibria.19
Finally, as outlined above, low types must choose (0, 0), and the intuitive criterion implies
that a high type need not signal any more than necessary to prevent imitation. No other
separating equilibrium can exist. If (2) has multiple solutions, there are multiple equilibria:
some symmetric, some not. In any equilibrium, low types of both candidates do nothing,
voters believe a candidate is a high type if and only if she chooses a (q, f) pair such that
c(q, f |L) ≥ xL. Voters select high types over low types and select either candidate with
equal probability if they are believed to be the same type. High-ability candidates choose
any solution to (2), be their choices the same or not. For simplicity, we focus on symmetric
equilibria. This is weaker than assuming that (2) has a unique solution.
3.2 Campaign Finance Reform
There are many proposals for campaign finance reform. They range from banning outright
the raising and spending of campaign funds, to completely deregulating the sources and uses
of funds. We model campaign finance reform as any policy such that the only funds with
signaling value are those raised below a threshold f̂ ≥ 0.
In the United States, candidate spending on an election is considered protected speech
under the First Amendment. Outright spending caps are therefore considered unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. However, publicly funded matching contributions is a common
proposal for campaign finance reform that meets constitutional muster and the above defi-
nition.
Under a publicly funded matching contributions scheme candidates are expected to raise
some amount to show that they are a serious candidate (f̂ ≥ 0 in our model). Candidates
are then given an additional amount of money such that they have the same amount to
spend on their campaign. If any candidate raises and spends more than f̂ , public funds are
19Of course, it is also necessary that there exist signals costly enough to deter the low type from imitation
(Assumption 1).
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either removed from the offending candidate or more are given to the other candidate such
that they both have equal funds. In the context of our model these additional funds would
be costly to raise and have no signaling value so no candidate would choose to exceed the
cap.20
We first analyze the game under full reform, f̂ = 0. As always, low-ability candidates do




s.t. c(qH , 0|L) ≥ xL
The solution is {qH : c(qH , 0|L) = xL}, which is unique. Assumption 2 still guarantees that
separation is worth its cost to a high type.
In the games depicted by Figures 1.a–1.c, a high type must relocate to her isocost curve
that touches the thick curve right at its q-intercept. This is a more costly action for a high
type to undertake than her action without reform. In Figure 1.e, however, this relocation is
equally costly to any of the solutions under no reform. The reason is that when the two types
have the same curves, all that matters is how much cost was incurred to separate—regardless
of how that cost was incurred. The problem becomes unidimensional, and thus there is no
loss to a high type. Figure 1.d shows a corner solution when a high type’s trade-off is more
favorable toward policymaking than is a low type’s. This leads to the corner solution of
signaling solely through policymaking even without reform. Hence, reform will not alter
anything here.
Of course, reform need not be full (f̂ = 0) to be meaningful. Conversely, as Figures 1.d
and 1.e show, full reform need not be meaningful. We formalize this in the definition below.
Consider an equilibrium, of which there can be many, of a game without reform where a
high type selects a pair (qH , fH). For a given election game and equilibrium level fH :
20See Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) for an in-depth discussion of campaign finance and
reform.
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Definition 2 Reform f̂ is meaningful if f̂ < fH . Reform f̂ is meaningless if f̂ ≥ fH .21
Consider the cost structure in Figure 2, which is the same as Figure 1.a with meaningful
reform. There is only one equilibrium in Figure 1.a, and hence only one fH to worry about.
If f̂ is set at or above fH the game is unaffected. If f̂ is set below fH , the reformed game has
a unique equilibrium where high types select (q˜H , f̂), satisfying c(q˜H , f̂ |L) = xL. It is clear
from the figure that as f̂ is lowered, the quality of policy chosen by a high type increases.
Greater reform leads to better policymaking.
Figure 2: Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform Increases Quality of Policy.
Notice that a level of reform f̂ can be meaningful for some equilibria and meaningless for
other equilibria of the same game. Therefore, when considering a reform, it is important to
know which equilibrium is expected to be played. Henceforth we consider only meaningful
reform.
3.3 Comparison
21Reducing the cap on individual or Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions affects both high
and low type’s cost functions. The equilibrium effects will depend on how these restrictions change a high
type’s cost function relative to a low type’s. This differs from the reforms we consider here which effectively
limit the actions available to candidates.
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Since all equilibria (both with and without reform) are separating, an elected official is always
of the highest ability available in her election. Reform does not lead to an increase in the
(expected) quality of the elected politician. Therefore, utility in the second period is the
same with or without reform for all players.
The difference under reform comes from increasing the (expected) quality of the policy
made in the first period. If the incumbent is a high type, any meaningful reform will increase
her level of q in the first period. This is costly to her, but beneficial to voters. If the incumbent
is a low type, reform will not matter; she does nothing in either case. Further, if challengers
are high-ability politicians in other government posts, their selection of q˜H under reform in
the first period increases the utility of the constituency of that position.
4 Repeated Elections
4.1 No Campaign Finance Reform
We now return to the repeated elections model and dispense with the direct benefit to voters
of having a high-type politician in office. That is, voters only value high-quality policy
(vt = qt). We find the set of symmetric Markov Perfect equilibria where, in each election,
low types do nothing and high types separate as cheaply as possible. Further, voters always
vote for high types over low types and vote for either candidate with equal probability in
elections between candidates of the same type. Of course a degenerate equilibrium, in which
voters expect that candidates will never signal, always exists. If a candidate who is never
expected to signal does, voters will not change their behavior and elect her with certainty
since they still expect she will not signal in the future. Campaign finance reform will have
no effect on the degenerate equilibrium.
For expositional clarity it is useful to define T (x), the minimum cost to a high type of
preventing imitation when low types gain x from imitation.
Definition 3 Let the function T : R+ → R+ be the value function of the minimization
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problem
T (x) = min
qH ,fH
c(qH , fH |H)
s.t. c(qH , fH |L) ≥ x
The T function is found in exactly the same manner as in the one-shot model. Recall
that xθ is defined as the incremental gain of being perceived as a high type relative to a
low type, not taking costs into account. However, in the one-shot election xθ was common
for both types, and it was a simple change in probability that we could calculate before
investigating the actions of each type. With an infinite horizon, xθ is different for different
types and endogenous to the system.
Proposition 2 A symmetric separating Markov Perfect equilibrium always exists. All sym-
metric Markov Perfect equilibria either entail repeated least cost separation or are degenerate.
The non-degenerate equilibria are virtually identical to repetitions of the equilibria in
the single election model. In each period, as required by our equilibrium concept, low types
do nothing and high types differentiate themselves as cheaply as possible. Voters select high
types over low types because high types have a greater chance than low types of being high
types in the next period.
4.2 Campaign Finance Reform
Again, campaign finance reform is a limit, f̂ , to the amount candidates can signal through
fundraising in each period. We argue that reform will lead to an increase in the equilibrium
level of policy chosen by high-type candidates each period. In the one-shot game, such a
claim was straightforward to show. In the repeated election setting it is no longer so clear.
Let T be the value function without reform and T˜ be the value function with reform. Since
reform restricts what high types can do, it must be that T˜ (x) ≥ T (x) for all x.
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Figure 3: The Post Reform Equilibrium is in the Shaded Region.
Recall that xL is a low type’s gain from imitating a high type. We saw above that xL
depends on the value of the possibility of being re-elected, ρ(L). Since a low type might
become a high type in a subsequent period, ρ(L) depends on what a high type will expend
in subsequent periods, T (xL). If high types must expend more to differentiate themselves, it
is not worth as much to low types to imitate them. However, if the low type’s gain to being
seen as a high type goes down, high types need not work as hard to differentiate themselves:
decreasing xL slackens the constraint. Hence, instituting reform has two effects working in
opposite directions. It raises the cost of achieving separation for any given xL, but it lowers
the equilibrium level of xL.
Proposition 3 Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform leads to an increase in the equilib-
rium level of policy chosen by high-type candidates.
A graph is helpful to understand the intuition of the proof. Figure 3 depicts the same
isocosts as Figure 1.a and Figure 2. The bold curve represents the isocost c(q, f |L) = x,
where x is the level of xL in the repeated game without reform. The thin curve represents
the isocost c(q, f |H) = T (x), and qH is the equilibrium level of q chosen by a high type in
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the game without reform. Reform then caps fundraising at f̂ . Let x˜ be the level of xL in
the repeated game with this reform.
What will a high type’s new equilibrium action (q˜H , f˜H) be? Obviously, fundraising will
be at or below f̂ . There are three potential regions for the solution to lie in: points on or
inside the high type’s isocost curve, c(q˜H , f˜H |H) ≤ T (x), points on or outside the low type’s
isocost curve, c(q˜H , f˜H |L) ≥ x, or points in the shaded region between the two isocosts,
c(q˜H , f˜H |H) > T (x) and c(q˜H , f˜H |L) < x. The new solution must lie in this shaded region.
Suppose that at the new solution c(q˜H , f˜H |L) ≥ x. Then after reform a low type is willing
to pay at least as much to imitate a high type as under no reform, x˜ ≥ x. But high types
are paying strictly more to separate themselves, T˜ (x˜) > T (x). However, if high types are
paying more to separate, it is less profitable for low types to imitate them. This means that
low types are willing to pay at least as much for something that is worth strictly less, an
obvious contradiction.
Suppose that at the new solution c(q˜H , f˜H |H) ≤ T (x). Then after reform high types are
paying no more to separate themselves than without reform, T˜ (x˜) ≤ T (x). But a low type is
willing to pay strictly less to imitate a high type, x˜ < x. However, if high types are paying
no more to separate, it is at least as profitable for low types to imitate them. This means
that low types are willing to pay strictly less for something that is worth at least as much,
also a contradiction.
In the shaded region high types pay more to separate and low types are willing to pay
less to imitate high types. Thus q˜H , the level of policy a high type enacts after reform, must
be greater than qH , the level without reform. In fact, q˜H > q where q satisfies c(q, f̂ |L) = x,
implying q˜H > q > qH . Thus, for any meaningful reform we can give a lower bound on the
necessary increase in qH , and this bound is strictly larger than zero.
As in Section 3.3, the increase in the equilibrium level of qH prompted by reform increases
the per-period effort of high-ability politicians. Thus, reform harms high-ability politicians
each period and lowers their continuation value. Unlike Section 3.3, which considered a one
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shot game, reform also harms low-ability politicians. Low-ability politicians may become
high ability in the future, so the continuation values of low-ability politicians decrease as
well. This allows us to establish our central result:
Theorem 1 Meaningful campaign finance reform increases voter welfare and decreases the
welfare of politicians.
4.3 Can Voters do Better?
How can it be that voters care only about the quality of policy, but from their perspective
even high-ability politicians perpetually offer too little quality policy and too much fundrais-
ing? The answer lies in the dual role of quality policy and voters’ failure to commit to vote
on past performance rather than future expectations. When casting his vote, a rational
voter cares only about the expected level of policy to be provided by the winning candidate:
q-tomorrow. To a candidate, policy q-today is only a way to signal her ability. Every period
high-ability politicians in office signal in the cheapest way that will guarantee separation.
All players know that whomever is elected, the pattern will start anew. Signaling through
fundraising amounts to a vicious cycle from which voters cannot escape.
Voters would gain from the ability to reward or punish politicians that provide high or low
quality policy with promises of a high or low probability of re-election. There are two ways,
both of which our model disallows, to make such promises credible in a repeated game. First,
we assume that if voters receive the same continuation value from both candidates they must
elect each with equal probability. If voters broke ties according to a history dependent rule,
they could squeeze higher quality policy out of their politicians. However, as the number of
types increases, the mechanics of our model will not change, but any tie-breaking rule will
have only a second-order effect on equilibrium behavior. A candidate’s sole concern will be
to credibly signal her type, as it is in our model.
Second, the Markov property rules out equilibria in which high-ability candidates are
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punished for not providing more q than required for least-cost separation. To support re-
peated game equilibria of this sort voters must face punishment, for example by moving to a
lower payoff equilibrium, if they fail to punish a deviating candidate. This punishment must
be either self-induced, which lacks credibility, or requires significant coordination between
candidates. However, if candidates are able to coordinate a move to an equilibrium that
punishes voters (and therefore benefits themselves), they should do so regardless of any past
play.
Campaign finance reform provides an institutional change that benefits voters, though
not as much as an optimal commitment contract would. Obviously, an optimal contract
will not provide any rewards to fundraising.22 Full campaign finance reform delivers this
property. However, in general, an optimal contract will be a menu of election probabilities
pi(q) such that 1 ≥ pi(qH) ≥ pi(qL) ≥ 0, where qH ≥ qL ≥ 0, but qL (and therefore pi(qL))
need not, and in general will not, be equal to zero. So the voters would strictly prefer an
optimal contract to reform, and strictly prefer reform to no reform.
5 Extensions
In this section we demonstrate how our model can be extended to explain many of the
literature’s stylized facts and encapsulate existing theories.
5.1 Lack of Reform
The most obvious stylized fact our model explains is why true campaign finance reform is
never implemented. Reform harms politicians. Politicians govern the rules of their own
re-election contests, and therefore choose to keep the system most favorable to them.
22Recall from contract theory that an optimal contract is a contract that is optimal for the principal (in





Our model also captures the well known advantage incumbents have over their challengers in
re-election races. In our model the incumbency advantage is purely a selection effect.23 Let
αt be the probability an incumbent is a high type in period t. In steady state αt = αt+1 = α
is defined by the probability that the winner was a high type last period multiplied by p,
plus the probability that the winner was a low type last period multiplied by p:
α = (1− (1− α)(1− p))p+ (1− α)(1− p)p
=
p(1 + p− p)
1 + (1− p)(p− p) ∈ (p, p)
The probability that an incumbent wins an election is therefore:










Notice that the incumbency advantage obtains regardless of whether reform is instituted or
not.
5.2.2 Differential Fundraising
The selection effect that drives incumbents’ electoral advantage also implies that they will
raise and spend more campaign funds than their challengers. Incumbents are more likely to
be high types, and high types raise funds, while low types do not.
An extension of the model (discussed at length in an earlier working paper: Daley and
Snowberg, 2006) shows that this effect is strengthened in elections with more than two
23Gowrisankaran, Mitchell and Moro (2006) estimate that half of the incumbency advantage in the U.S.
Senate can be explained by the selection effect and the other half by deterrence of high-quality challengers.
Ashworth (2005), among others, derives the incumbency advantage as a selection effect. For more on the
incumbency advantage see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002).
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candidates. When there are more than two candidates, each candidate’s equilibrium level of
effort is strictly decreasing in her opponents’ likelihood of being high types. Thus, in elections
with more than two candidates (no matter how unlikely it is that the third candidate will
win), even high type challengers will raise less funds on average than high type incumbents
since incumbents are more likely to be high types than challengers are (α ≥ p).
5.2.3 Deterring Challengers
Epstein and Zemsky (1995) (in a theoretical study) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997) (in an
empirical study) argue that deterring high-quality challengers is an important source of the
incumbency advantage. Our model does not allow candidates the choice of whether or not
to run. However, we can employ an extension to analyze this phenomenon. Consider a type
θ politician holding government position X, which she values at uX . She may either run
for re-election or challenge the incumbent in government position Y, who was observed to
be a high type last period. She values position Y at uY . If she runs for re-election her
expected utility is uXpiθ(p) − c(q, f |θ). If she runs for position Y , her expected utility is
uY piθ(p)− c(q, f |θ). Thus, she will run for office Y if and only if:





p < p implies that
piθ(p)
piθ(p)
≥ 1. So, unless the value of position Y is sufficiently larger than the
value of position X, high-ability incumbents will deter challengers.
However, high-ability incumbents deter low-ability challengers more easily than high-










which means that the difference between uY and uX required for low types to challenge
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for position Y is greater than the difference required for high types to challenge. However,
it is reasonable to assume that on average high types will hold more coveted offices than
low types. That is, we would see high types in offices X and low types in offices Z, where
uX > uZ . Then there exist values such that:
uX
2− p
2− p > uY and uZ
1− p
1− p ≤ uY
implying high-type challengers will be deterred because they already hold reasonably valued
offices, while low types will run for position Y because they hold lesser offices. The assump-
tion of values satisfying these inequalities is equivalent to the common assumption that high
types have higher outside options than low types do. Of course, low types who luck into X
offices will be disinclined to challenge for Y , and high types who hold very low offices will
be inclined to challenge for higher positions.
This extension raises a further issue regarding the welfare effects of reform. Let us assume
that high types have higher outside options. Recall that reform decreases that value of being
in office. Hence, a reasonable first-pass conclusion is that reform makes office less attractive,
which decreases the number of high types who run for office. This would lower the value of p,
the probability of a challenger being a high type.24 Now, the effect of reform on voter welfare
is ambiguous. Reform raises the level of quality policy high types produce, but it lowers the
probability that a high type will be in office. These forces pull in opposite directions, and
thus whether voters are better or worse off will depend on candidates’ cost functions and
outside options.
5.3 Bloomberg Signaling
24If the values of outside options are independent of the number of potential candidates taking them, then
p will either decrease to zero or be unchanged. If the values of outside options are decreasing in the number
of potential candidates that take them, then p can decrease, but remain positive. Take the latter to be the
case.
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If we assume that challengers hold other offices, they can use policymaking to signal their
abilities just as incumbents can. Suppose this were not the case. A challenger who holds
no office can only signal through fundraising. Thus, non-office-holding challengers will, in
general, need to raise and spend more funds to demonstrate they are high quality than the
incumbents they run against.25
We see that our model encapsulates many findings from campaign finance and electoral
politics. This framework could be used to discuss political phenomena that are not obviously
connected to campaign finance, such as the explosion of pork in recent years (see, for example,
Evans (2004)). If we posit that pork has value in signaling a candidate’s ability (which it
certainly does) and that there has been a shock to the relative costs of signaling through
campaign finance or pork, this would produce results qualitatively similar to what has been
observed in recent years.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated a model in which campaign fundraising is purely a signaling activity.
Even though campaign contributions are not buying political favors, we still find that voters
will benefit from campaign finance reform, while politicians will oppose it. There is a simple
intuition behind the result, which is more general than this single application. When senders
have multiple signaling channels at their disposal, and receivers cannot credibly commit to
ignoring any of these channels, senders will use the least costly signals to reveal their types—
even if receivers would prefer different signals were used. Further, even if senders only use
channels preferable to receivers, receivers cannot credibly commit to respond in pre-specified
ways. Policies that restrict signaling channels that are less preferable to receivers can partially
substitute for commitment mechanisms, improving receiver welfare at the expense of senders.
25For example, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New Jersey Senator and now Governor
John Corzine. Note that throughout we have not distinguished between raising and spending funds. It is
not enough to have money, a candidate must spend it on their campaign.
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Appendix
Proposition 1 In the one-shot game, all equilibria are separating with low types choosing
(qL, fL) = (0, 0) and high types choosing a solution to (2). A symmetric equilibrium always
exists, and is the unique equilibrium if and only if there is a unique solution to (2).
Proof. First, we construct equilibria where candidates play as prescribed. Let (qθ, fθ) denote
the action chosen by a candidate with type θ ∈ {L,H}, and µ(q, f) denote the probability
voters assign to a candidate being an H type given her action (q, f). Let µ(q, f) = 1 if
c(q, f |L) ≥ x, and µ(q, f) = 0 otherwise. Given (qL, fL) = (0, 0) and (qH , fH) is a solution
to (2), the proposed beliefs are consistent with candidates’ actions and our equilibrium
definition. If µi > µj, voters select candidate i. If µi = µj, voters select either candidate
with probability 1
2
. Voter behavior is clearly optimal given their beliefs. Since the solution
to (2) exists, an H type’s action is well specified. Fix one candidate playing as prescribed,
and consider deviations by the other candidate. µ(qH , fH) = 1 implies an H type cannot
gain by deviating to any (q, f) such that c(q, f |H) ≥ c(qH , fH |H). By (qH , fH) a solution
to (2), a deviation to any (q, f) such that c(q, f |H) < c(qH , fH |H) results in µ(q, f) = 0.
c(qH , fH |L) = x and Assumption 2 guarantee that this cannot be optimal. If an L type
deviates to a (q, f) such that 0 < c(q, f |L) < x, she will be strictly worse off since µ(0, 0) =
µ(q, f) = 0, but her costs have increased. If she deviates to a (q, f) such that c(q, f |L) ≥ x
then µ(q, f) = 1. She is no better off since x is exactly the utility gain of moving from µ = 0
to µ = 1. This completes the construction.
We show that pooling is impossible by contradiction. Consider a potential equilibrium
in which the two types of candidate i pool: each plays (qp, fp) with positive probability, and
i wins with probability αip when she plays (qp, fp). Let α
i
H be the probability i wins if she









H . Consider µ(q
′, f ′) for a (q′, f ′) such that
26αiH may be different from piH since we have not assumed that candidate j is using a separating strategy.
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(q′, f ′) ≥ (qp, fp) and
c(q′, f ′|H)− c(qp, fp|H) < αH − αp < c(q′, f ′|L)− c(qp, fp|L)
A (q′, f ′) pair that satisfies this property is worse for an L type and better for an H type
than (qp, fp) if µ(q
′, f ′) = 1. The intuitive criterion mandates that µ(q′, f ′) = 1 for any such
(q′, f ′). Assumptions 1 and 2 and continuity of the cost functions ensure such a pair exists.
Hence, an H type has a profitable deviation and there cannot be pooling in equilibrium.
Since neither candidate’s types can pool, both candidates’ types will be revealed preceding
the election. Voters select candidates based only on their revealed types. We now rule
out non-least cost separating equilibria. Consider a proposed separating equilibrium with
(qL, fL) 6= (0, 0). Then µ(0, 0) ≥ µ(qL, fL) = 0 and c(qL, fL|L) > c(0, 0|L) = 0. So (0, 0)
is a profitable deviation for an L type, contradicting the equilibrium hypothesis. Hence,
(qL, fL) = (0, 0). Fixing (qL, fL) = (0, 0), consider a proposed separating equilibrium with
(qH , fH) such that c(qH , fH |L) > x. Then, by continuity, there exists a (q′H , f ′H) ≤ (qH , fH)
such that c(q′H , f
′
H |H) < c(qH , fH |H) but c(q′H , f ′H |L) > x. The intuitive criterion mandates
that µ(q′H , f
′




H) is a profitable deviation for an H type, contradicting
the equilibrium hypothesis. Now consider a proposed separating equilibrium with (qH , fH)
such that c(qH , fH |L) < x. Then by deviating to (qH , fH) a low type’s expected payoff
is x − c(qH , fH |L) > 0, making it a profitable deviation and contradicting the equilibrium
hypothesis.
Therefore, all equilibria must be least cost separating—the set of equilibria constructed
above. If (2) has a unique solution, this set is singleton and both candidates must use the
same strategy. 
On Markov state variables: There is considerable subtly in choosing what are the
allowable state variables in Markov Perfect equilibria (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006)
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and Maskin and Tirole (2001)). In our game we identify the state variables as the types
of the two candidates, {θt1, θt2}. In other dynamic settings it is reasonable to allow for the
uninformed players’ beliefs about the informed players’ types be part of the Markov state
(Kreps and Wilson, 1982b; Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986; Abreu and Gul, 2000; Bar-
Isaac, 2003; Phelan, 2006; Daley and Green, 2009). However, in these games, the unknown
type has direct effect on the uninformed player’s payoff, that is, the unknown type is directly
payoff relevant. Including players’ beliefs in the state is the only way to generate reasonable
stationary equilibria.
In our model, this is not the case. If beliefs are included in the state, players can use
them as coordination devices. For example, consider the following equilibrium: when the
incumbent is believed to be a high type with probability p or p both types of candidates pool
at the signal (0, 0), otherwise both candidates play separating strategies.27 Voters always
elect high types over low types in separating periods, they vote randomly after pooling when
the beliefs are (p, p), and they elect the incumbent for sure after pooling when the beliefs
are (p, p). The pooling periods survive in equilibrium because if a candidate were to break
the pooling and identify herself as either a high type or a low type for sure, she would not
be elected—electing her guarantees that the system transitions to a pooling period, which
is worse for voters. We believe that such equilibria violate the spirit of Markov Perfect
equilibrium as summarized by Maskin and Tirole (2001), “[In Markov Perfect equilibria]
strategies depend on as few variables as possible; they involve no complex ‘bootstrapping’
in which each player conditions on a particular variable only because others do the same.”
Proposition 2 A symmetric separating Markov Perfect equilibrium always exists. All sym-
metric Markov Perfect equilibria either entail repeated least cost separation or are degenerate.
Proof. The set of symmetric Markov Perfect equilibria where in each election (qL, fL) =
(0, 0), H types separate as cheaply as possible, voters always vote for H types over L types
27The challenger always has probability p of being a high type, so there is no variation to condition on.
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1 + pV (H|p) + (1− p)V (L|p))− xL (IC.6)
Equations (V.1) through (V.4) are standard dynamic programming value functions.
V (θ|p) is the value of being type θ and facing an opponent who is an H type with probabil-
ity p. xL and xL are the costs L types would have to incur to successfully imitate H types
when facing opponents with priors p and p respectively. Equations (IC.5) and (IC.6) are
the binding IC constraints. From Section 4, we know that the T function is well defined.
Solving the system gives that xL = xL and yields a specific value for this term.
28
A solution always exits and is unique. First, the system (V.2), (V.4), (IC.5), (IC.6)
consists of four linear equations and five unknowns (V (H|p) does not appear). From these
four equations, we obtain unique solutions for V (H|p), V (L|p), V (L|p), and xL in terms of
xL. V (H|p) is also determined uniquely in terms of xL from (V.3). Hence, our solution
exists, and is unique, if and only if there exists a unique xL satisfying the updated (V.1).
28As in the one-shot game, xL is constant with respect to the opponent’s priors p ∈ (0, 1), hence xL = xL.
In richer settings this will not be the case.
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Substituting into (V.1), then rearranging, gives:
2xL − δxL
(


















+(1− p)xL(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V (L|p)
− T (xL)
0 = k + axL − T (xL) (A.7)
Where k and a are constants:
k =







δ2(2− 3p+ p2)(p− p) + 2δ(1 + p2 + 2p− p(2 + p))− 4) < 0
k > 0 gives that the right-hand side of (A.7) is positive when xL = 0. a < 0 and T strictly
increasing give that the right-hand side of (A.7) is strictly decreasing, and is negative for xL
large enough. Therefore (A.7) has a unique solution, and thus so does the entire system.
We now construct the repeated least-cost separating equilibria. Since the equilibrium is
stationary, we specify play and beliefs for a single arbitrary time period. Consider the play
of a candidate facing an opponent who plays as prescribed and has prior p. In equilibrium
(qL, fL) = (0, 0), H types choose a pair satisfying: c(qH , fH |H) = T (xL) and c(qH , fH |L) =
xL. Voters’ beliefs are µ(q, f) = 1 if c(q, f |L) ≥ xL, and µ(q, f) = 0 otherwise. These beliefs
are correct given the candidates’ strategies. Voters then select H types over L types and
select either candidate with equal probability if they are equally likely to be H types. By
stationarity, voters know that an L type in office next period will set qL = 0, but an H type
will set qH > 0. Voters prefer an H type to be in office. However, in the next period a
candidate may no longer be the same type she revealed this period. By p > p, an H type
is at least as likely to be an H type again as an L type is become an H type. Thus, voters
prefer to select candidates they perceive to be H types before the election. The specified
voting behavior is optimal given beliefs. µ(qH , fH) = 1 implies H types cannot gain from
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deviating to any (q, f) such that c(q, f |H) ≥ c(qH , fH |H). By c(qH , fH |H) = T (xL) and
c(qH , fH |L) = xL, a deviation to any (q, f) such that c(q, f |H) < c(qH , fH |H) results in
µ(q, f) = 0. Since H types value office at least as much as L types (xH ≥ xL), and L
types are indifferent between imitating H types or not (IC.5), Assumption 2 guarantees that
being perceived as an L type cannot be optimal for an H type. If an L type deviates to a
(q, f) such that 0 < c(q, f |L) < xL, she will be strictly worse off since µ(0, 0) = µ(q, f) = 0
but her costs have increased. If she deviates to a to a (q, f) such that c(q, f |L) ≥ xL then
µ(q, f) = 1. She is no better off since xL is exactly the utility gain of moving from µ = 0 to
µ = 1. Everything is analogous for candidates facing opponents with prior p, using T (xL)
and xL in place of T (xL) and xL.
We now show that all non-degenerate symmetric equilibria are least cost separating. A
strategy for a candidate is simply a map from her type to some (possible mixed) action
σ(θ). Denote the expected per period q selected by a candidate of type θ as E[q|θ]. One of
the following must hold: E[q|H] > E[q|L], E[q|H] = E[q|L], or E[q|H] < E[q|L]. Suppose
that E[q|H] > E[q|L]. Then voters wish to elect high types over low types. Hence, pooling
equilibria and non-least cost separating equilibria are ruled out by the same arguments given
in the proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that E[q|H] = E[q|L]. Then voters receive the same
continuation value from any candidate regardless of type. If the equilibrium does not specify
that σ = (0, 0) for both types, then there is a profitable deviation. A candidate of either
type can deviate to (0, 0), save costs and still be elected with the same probability, 1
2
. Hence,
E[q|H] = E[q|L] in equilibrium if and only if the equilibrium is degenerate. Suppose that
E[q|H] < E[q|L]. Then voters prefer low-type candidates over high-type candidates. Then a
high type will choose to deviate and imitate a low type (which she can always do profitably
since she has a cost advantage over a low type), contradicting the hypothesis. 
Proposition 3 Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform leads to an increase in the equilib-
rium level of policy chosen by high-type candidates.
Appendix–6
Proof. Solving the system of equations (V.1) through (IC.6) yields:
xL = xL =
2δ − 2T (xL)pδ + 2pδ2 − 2pδ2 + ppδ2 − p2δ2





(4− 2δ) + (p− 2)(p− p)(2δ + δ2(p− 1)) < 0 (V.9)
To see that (V.9) is negative note that the numerator is negative. Also: (4− 2δ) > 0,
(p − 2) < 0, (p − p) > 0, and (2δ + δ2(p − 1)) > 0. The first term in the denominator is
positive and the second is negative. The first term is minimized at δ = 1, and the second
term is minimized (i.e. made maximally negative) at δ = 1, p = 0, p = 1. At these parameter
values, the denominator is zero. Hence, the denominator is positive for all δ in [0, 1] and
p < p both in (0, 1).
Let x be the level of xL prior to reform, and x˜ be its level after reform is implemented.
From the text we know T˜ (x) ≥ T (x) for all x. Let q˜H and f˜H be the post reform levels of q
and f selected by an H type. Assume, by way of contradiction, that T˜ (x˜) < T (x). By T and
T˜ non-decreasing and T˜ ≥ T , T˜ (x˜) < T (x) implies x > x˜. But this contradicts (V.9). Hence,
the amount a high type is willing to pay for separation must not decrease following reform:
T˜ (x˜) ≥ T (x). Since c(q, f |H) is strictly increasing, and the no reform level of fundraising
was fH > f˜H , T˜ (x˜) = c(q˜H , f˜H |H) ≥ c(qH , fH |H) = T (x) implies q˜H > qH . 
Theorem 1 Meaningful campaign finance reform increases voter welfare and decreases the
welfare of politicians.
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